Personal Finance Info

This blog will contain information about personal financial planning items of interest to CPA advisors and others. It also has information on Israel, public affairs, culture and other things I care about.

Name:
Location: United States

I live with my husband and our spoiled dogs—an English Springer Spaniel, Sasha and an English Setter, Alley in Westfield, NJ.

Monday, October 06, 2008

Subprime lending, the credit crisis, and MORE

Okay so for months you’ve heard about subprime lending, people losing their homes, the housing market declining, banks firing their CEOs and writing off billions, and, basically, our economy taking a turn for the worst. so WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?!

This post will (attempt to) define subprime lending & the resulting “credit crisis.”

In a nutshell, since the housing market was up pepole wanted to buy homes because they thought the price of their home would continue to appreciate (increase in value). Mortgage lenders began doling out the mortgages to even those whose credit history was bad, or SUB PRIME, or who didn’t have the money to back themselves up. These subprime loans were too good to be true, with no money down and often very low interest rates for the first few years. What the lenders were duped (or allowed themselves to be duped) into was actually a loan that they would not be able to pay back, because in the later years those interest rates would rise to much higher rates. Indeed, the borrowers were unable to pay the loans back and they defaulted (when a debtor is unable to meet his financial obligations). The lenders then had to foreclose their houses (when a bank repossesses a house due to the owner’s failure to comply with the agreement, ie pay the mortgage) and the homeowners got screwed. Example, in Cleveland one in every ten homes is foreclosed.

So obviously that hurts individual homeowners (displaced from their homes), that hurts the mortgage lenders (did not receive mortgage payments from hundreds of borrowers), and that hurts the real estate market because there are a bunch of homes that can’t be sold (becasue people can’t get the loans they used to be able to get), or that are on the market for a much lower price.

What about Wall Street? Well, this is where it gets tricky. What happened in the middle of all of this was…… Wall Street (and by Wall Street I mean the big banks, think Merrill or Citi) either expanded its own mortgage arm to lend out those subprime loans, or they bought the mortgages from the mortgage lenders, acquiring all of the future repayments from the lenders as well as all of the risk. They then packaged up hundreds of those mortgages into a single security called a CDO (collateralized debt obligation - Which if you think about it makes sense. It’s a group of obligations from debtors (the borrowers) with collateral (their newly purchased homes) to back them up). They sold these CDOs to each other, and to hedge funds and other financial institutions for money. It’s like selling an IOU for $100 in the future to someone who will give you $90 today.

Okay, so with every kind of security (an investment instrument representing financial value) there are rating agencies (Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s) who rate the quality of the security. Well, the rating agencies gave the CDO’s high ratings, meaning there was little risk that the borrower would default. This provided impetus for the hedge funds to buy more CDOs. Everything was hunky dorey and both Wall Street and hedge funds were raking in the dough until the cookie began to crumble and everyone realized they were dealing with an investment instrument that lacked any financial value (you see, because the instrument depended on the mortgages from the individual borrowers who did not have the money to repay the loans). The whole system crashed, many hedge funds had to shut down, and Wall Street wrote off billions (and fired many).

STOP!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! That’s all you need to kow. For further reading, check out below (though I’ve been told it is too confusing, it goes into a bit more detail). Also, here is a link to an easy explanation.

What it is: Subprime lending basically means lending to people who have deficient credit history but who have collateral, like a house, to guarantee the loan. The interest schedule usually has low initial “teaser” rates (like no money down, no questions asked) that reset in later years to much higher rates. The borrower is typically unable to handle those higher rates and, basically, they’re set up to default (definition: when a debtor cannot meet his financial obligations).

Who lends & who receives: The borrower is someone with bad credit (from credit cards, previous loans, previous apartment rent), or who is in an adverse financial situation. The lenders are mortgage lenders.

How is the lending done: Subprime lending is through mortgages, car loans, credit cards, etc. Wall Street (think Citibank and Merrill Lynch) either makes these loans or steps in to buy those mortgages from the mortgage lenders. They repackage a hundreds of these loans into single CDO (collateralized debt obligation) packages. Then they sell them to hedge funds & other investors. The buyer of the CDO is given the right to both the cash inflows from the borrowers, and, of course, the risk.

Why does subprime lending happen: The recent boom in subprime lending was really a result of the housing boom – borrowers wanted homes because they bet on increasing house price appreciation, mortgage lenders wanted to lend them money to buy the homes. This is where it gets controversial. It is thought that it is unregulated predatory lending – the lenders are aware that the borrowers will not be able to repay the loans, which will lead to default, seizure of collateral, and foreclosure, as we saw this summer. Additionally, borrowers should have known better and were easily coerced.

Ahuh, ahuh, so what ACTUALLY happened:

What happened was the CDO’s (and thus the individual mortgages) that Wall Street were selling were given high credit ratings by rating agencies, who basically define the credit worthiness, or the borrower’s ability pay back the loan. This high rating encouraged hedge funds and other financial institutions to buy the CDO’s from the banks.

Basically, the whole system caught up with itself this year when a far greater than anticipated percent of borrowers defaulted and were unable to pay their loans. (didn’t see that one coming..)

This affected..

Borrowers/homeowners - they can’t repay the loans, their assets were seized, their houses were foreclosed. In Cleveland, Ohio, one in ten homes is now vacant because of foreclosure. (definition of foreclosure: when a bank repossesses a house due to the owner’s failure to comply with the agreement, ie pay the mortgage)

Financial institutions –Wall Street bought the mortgages from the mortgage lenders or did their own lending. They turned around and sold off those mortgages in the form of CDO’s. Thus, they had more money for more lending, creating a snowball effect. They often sold off the CDO’s with an agreement to buy them back if there was no market to the buyer to turnaround and resell them. When the loans defaulted In the end the whole street wrote off billions and, of course, laid off many. Oh, and they put a cap on annual bonuses, at only $750,000 a year. Poor guys.

Hedge Funds – Since hedge funds bought into the fun little game, they, too, suffered losses. They bought the CDOs from the banks and then sold them to other financial institutions. Hedge funds also had repurchase agreements which say that the hedge fund will buy back the CDO at a later date for a greater amount of cash, basically protecting the buyer from default. Well, when the value of the CDO declined, the hedge funds didn’t have the cash or collateral to put up, the hedge fund was forced to liquidate their other assets. Many of them had to close down.

You, me, and our economy – That’s right. Now we’re looking at a recession.

I don’t have access to the same types of loans that I previously had, so I’m unable to spend as much money (especially during this holiday season when consumer spending is usually up up up). OR I saw the huge false demand for housing (false because it was being financed with money that nobody really had) which spurred me to enter the market and start building homes. Well now nobody is going to buy my homes and if they will, it will be for a much lower price than I anticipated. OR My home was foreclosed and I’ve been displaced. OR I live in a nice home in the suburbs that I thought was worth $500,000 and is not only worth $400,000. I feel a lot less rich and will likely curb my spending. OR I used to work for Merrill Lynch and I was laid off (unless I was the CEO, in which case I’m flying high) OR I worked/owned a hedge fund and got caught up in this mess and had to shut down/write off.

At least I think that’s what happened….

"The last wrench in the toolbox"

If you haven’t heard, the “mother of all bailouts” may soon take place in the US. The Federal Reserve plans to spend $700 billion to buy up mortgage related debt from our ailing banks so the banks will be able to lend again. Credit is, after all, what America runs on. As Bernanke put it, it’s “the last wrench in the toolbox” to fix our financial crisis. But how did we get here? Here’s where the blame game leads us…

Greenspan
He had interest rates too low for too long, which resulted in the housing bubble. But what is too low too long? You can’t blame the guy for thinking “innovation and structural change in the financial services industry have been critical in providing expanded access to credit for the vast majority of consumers, including those of limited means.”

Consolidated Supervised Entities Program
In 2004 the SEC changed the rules under which banks with at least $5-billion of capital calculate their gross leverage ratios. It basically raised the leverage ratio to 30, from about half that. A gross leverage ratio measures the amount of debt a company has compared to its net capital. There are different ways to calculate a leverage ratio - this law governed the comparison of debt to net capital (which is basically your total capital minus anything that can’t be easily converted into cash (like debt)). A leverage ratio of 30 basically means there was 30 times as much debt (bad stuff) as there is equity (good stuff). Under the law, the banks could take on more debt, which was good when times were good because it allowed them to make more transactions. However, high levels of debt means it takes only a small decline in the value of the firm for the bank to go bankrupt.

Five investment banks fell under the program: Goldman, Merrill, Lehman, Bear, and Morgan Stanley. It is noted that at the time of decline, Merrill had a leverage ratio of about 40, Lehman of 36.

Goodbye Uptick Rule
In 2007, the SEC eliminated the “uptick rule”, which prohibited sellers from shorting a share when the stock was selling for lower than the previous trade. This rule was instituted after the Crash of 1929, as shorting was alleged to be the culprit of the crash. After research and assessment of the rule, the SEC suggested the uptick didn’t matter and lifted the ban. Now, shorting has been blamed for today’s crisis and has been put on a temporary ban.

Hedge Funds
Hedge funds aren’t as highly levered as ibanks, but do they do a lot of shorting. Perhaps their ubiquity spurred the financial decline. They’ll pay whether or not that is the case. About 90% of hedge funds are currently losing money and that’s sure to increase with the advent of the short selling ban.

Ratings Agencies
It’s not the Fed’s job to allocate or assess risk, so we can’t truly blame Greenspan. But the job is someone’s responsibility. Whose? The ratings agencies, these government sanction oligopolies like Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. See, the ratings agencies slapped high ratings on all of the Mortgage Backed Securities. An MBS is a bundle of a bunch of loans, some dodgy, some not, that are all rolled into one tradable security, like a stock. The Ratings Agencies rate all securities based on their level of risk. Again, the ratings are a lot like school grades, A good, B okay/bad, C junk. The Ratings Agencies aren’t regulated by the SEC, and so were not really watched throughout this whole game. So they were able to slap high ratings on risky MBS’ last year, and then downgrade AIG last week, putting the onus of bailing them out on you and me.

The SEC
The SEC was created in 1933 to protect small investors against securities fraud. It doesn’t have robust oversight over all financial entities, ratings agencies included, and is not really equipped for our financial world.

The Deregulatory Financial Modernization Act of 1999
In 1933, Congress established a set of banking regulations under the Glass Steagall Act. Thinking commercial banks (ones that take deposits from everyday citizens) caused the Crash of 1929, the act separated the commercial banks and the investment banks. This way investment banks would take on risky investments, and commercial banks could protect its members by not. Before 1933, there were few investment banks and the Glass Steagall Act spurred Wall Street as we know (ahem, I mean knew) it.

The Glass Steagall Act was repealed, however, in 1999 under the Deregulatory Financial Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) Act. This allowed the commercial banks to take on the same risky bets that ibanks did. A commercial bank (one that sells to you and me, like Citigroup or WaMU) could trade Mortgage Backed Securities, Collateralized Debt Obligations, and other SIVs, Structured Investment Vehicles. So basically, it allowed the guys that are usually safe and who hold my life savings to take on risky investments and get all mixed up in the mess too.

The Glass Steagall Act of 1933
Or you could blame the Glass Steagall Act of 1933 (mentioned above) itself, for really creating the stand alone investment bank in the US

NPR today summed up by pointing out that the total of credit default swaps is enormously more than the total money in the world -- and that people were taking out credit default "insurance" on bonds they did not own, as a way of gambling.
It sounds exactly like "selling" a stock hoping it will go down.

And NPR said some bonds might have ten different credit "insurance" deals on them so if they fail, ten times as much money as the value would supposedly have to be handed over to the people who bought the "insurance."

And NPR said that these are secret, none are registered, there is no money set aside to cover them -- because values 'could only go up' so it seemed like free money with almost no risk.

And they said repeatedly, these were really , really smart people.

Any of that true?

Why not just require all these financial instruments to be publicly disclosed -- register them, book them. After a deadline (say, January 9th?) any that are not public are invalid.

Then -- everyone will know where the risk is.

FW: The Henry Waxman show-- Credit Crisis Reality TV on line

Credit Crisis Reality TV: Big List of Upcoming Hearings

The next few weeks of C-Span will be like a new credit crisis reality TV show. Just look at all the upcoming hearings that will likely be broadcast:

(You can go to site http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2209  where I am watching it live online……)

October 8, 2008: Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy
House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Waxman)

Hearings to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to the bankruptcy filing by Lehman Brothers.

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October 9, 2008: Causes and Effects of the AIG Bailout
House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Waxman)

Hearings to examine the regulatory mistakes and financial excesses that led to the government bailout of AIG. 

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October 16, 2008: The Regulation of Hedge Funds
House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Waxman)

Five fund managers who earned over $1 billion last year have been invited to testify about the role of hedge funds in the financial markets and their regulatory and tax status. The five witnesses are John Alfred Paulson, President, Paulson & Co., Inc.; George Soros, Chairman, Soros Fund Management LLC; Philip A. Falcone; Senior Managing Director, Harbinger Capital Partners; James Simons, Director, Renaissance Technologies LLC; and Kenneth C. Griffin, Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director, Citadel Investment Group.

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October 22, 2008: The Breakdown of Credit Rating Agencies
House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Waxman)

The CEOs of the nation’s three largest credit rating agencies have been invited to testify about the role of the credit rating agencies in the financial excesses on Wall Street. The three witnesses are Deven Sharma, President, Standard & Poor’s; Raymond W. McDaniel, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Moody’s Corporation; and Stephen Joint, President and Chief Executive Officer, Fitch Ratings.

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October 23, 2008: The Role of Federal Regulators
House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Waxman)

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, former Treasury Secretary John Snow, and current SEC Chairman Christopher Cox have been invited to testify about the role and responsibility of federal regulators in the Wall Street financial crisis.

One good news question-- no hearings with the Big 4 auditors?  This time!  As an aside, all of the above hearings are at 2154 Rayburn House Office Building soooo if you're in the DC area…should be fun.

The attachment should make it very clear to us all..  I free we have to go through it – to feel the pain. Happy New Year.

 

Phyllis Bernstein, CPA/PFS

Phyllis Bernstein Consulting, Inc

7 Penn Plaza, Ste 1600

New York, NY   10001

212-330-6075

www.pbconsults.com

 

 

why is it that Charlie Rose is one of the few in mainstream media taking this story seriously?

Larry Summers and Robert Rubin Talking Financials



An exclusive conversation with Warren Buffett

The creators of the financial mess may go unpunished.

For supporters of the Bush administration's $700-billion Wall Street bailout, it stands as a key selling point: a provision that limits pay packages for the heads of companies helped by the taxpayer-funded rescue program.

There's just one problem: It would do little to cap executive pay or rein in the enormous retirement packages - the golden parachutes - that have come to symbolize corporate excess.

Not only is the compensation provision vague, it is punched full of loopholes and leaves many issues of executive pay for the White House to decide later. Legal and political experts say the bill will do almost nothing to limit CEO compensation - even for companies that benefit handsomely from the taxpayers' generosity.

It wasn't supposed to be this way.

When Treasury Sec. Henry M. Paulson Jr. unveiled his controversial bailout plan without CEO pay limits, voters were outraged. Lawmakers scrambled to insert a change - responding to the reasonable sensibility that some of the nation's wealthiest people shouldn't get a windfall through a bailout necessitated by the crisis many of them helped create. Unfortunately for taxpayers, some experts say, the current bill won't prevent that from happening.

For example, under current law, businesses may claim a tax deduction for all salaries under $1 million. The bailout plan would lower that ceiling to $500,000 - but only in cases when the Treasury Dept. buys up more than $300 million of the company's toxic assets, not including those purchased directly from the company. In addition, the salary-deduction rule would apply only to five employees per company. That means participating firms would lose, at most, $2.5 million in deductible claims.

"It's not even a rounding error for a big financial institution," said Adam J. Levitin, a credit expert at Georgetown University Law Center.

In addition, as Rep. Brad Sherman (D-Cal.), an opponent of the rescue bill, pointed out, the tax-deduction language targets the companies but has no effect on the executives themselves.

The provisions to end golden parachutes are also plagued with gaping loopholes. The bill does nothing to alter terms of existing contracts, for example, instead allowing retirement packages negotiated before the bailout to proceed. For future employees, meanwhile, the bill would prohibit golden parachutes only when the executive is fired, or the company fails, despite the federal help.

Again, only companies dumping more than $300 million in bad assets are even subject to the golden parachute rules - and it can effect only five employees per company. That means an executive in a corporation receiving more than $300 million from the taxpayer-funded bailout would remain eligible for an unlimited retirement bonanza if that company became profitable and the executive retired voluntarily.

If that sounds vague - it is. The proposal currently asks the Treasury secretary to fill in the blanks after the bill is signed into law.

Another hole big enough to drive through: The proposal does nothing about stock options. So a bailed-out executive could be rewarded now with those options (trading low in the middle of the current financial crisis) and cash in - without penalty - for a windfall later if the company rebounds.

Experts point out why this loophole should be closed: Executives paid in enormous numbers of stock options have incentives to make risky investments - say, mortgage-backed securities - that could send the stock through the roof. Indeed, the AFL-CIO is dedicating its Executive Paywatch Website to the purpose of linking CEO pay to the current credit crisis.

Confused?

So is everyone. But that could be the point.

Lawmakers want to be able to say they've taken steps to control executive pay, while not stepping on too many toes in the powerful financial-services industry - perennially the largest contributor to Washington lawmakers.

Sarah Binder, political science professor at George Washington University and Brookings Institution scholar, said the complicated nature of the compensation issue plays to the political favor of the bill's supporters. "The details are too confusing for most people to understand," Binder said.

Levitin agreed, saying that backers of the "either haven't read the language or they're just shilling for the purpose of political cover."

In Congress, Sherman is not the only House Democrat to raise a red flag.

Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.) sent a letter to Democratic colleagues this week pointing out seven of the most egregious loopholes of the CEO compensation provision. "If you are considering voting for the bailout because the bill requires the CEOs of Wall Street to take a pay cut," DeFazio wrote, "you will be sorely disappointed."

The House killed their version of the bill Monday, but a modified Senate version easily passed the upper chamber Wednesday. Before that vote, Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) urged senators to kill the proposal. "Under this bill, the CEOs and the Wall Street insiders will still, with a little bit of imagination, continue to make out like bandits," Sanders said.

Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.), the chairman of the Senate banking committee, was quick to respond, calling the bill's compensation limits "anything but mild."

"It is the first time ever in the history of the Congress," Dodd said, "that we are actually going to pass legislation dealing with golden parachutes. More will be done, but this bill does take very concrete, specific actions in that regard."

All eyes were on the House Friday when it passed the Senate-passed bill, by a vote of 263-171. The legistlation was then quickly sent to President George W. Bush, who signed it.

Much has been made of the changes to that proposal - including $150 billion in tax benefits to businesses and families. Yet aside from one provision raising the upper limit on federal deposit insurance from $100,000 to $250,000, nothing substantial has changed within the financial rescue plan that the House rejected.