Personal Finance Info

This blog will contain information about personal financial planning items of interest to CPA advisors and others. It also has information on Israel, public affairs, culture and other things I care about.

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Location: United States

I live with my husband and our spoiled dogs—an English Springer Spaniel, Sasha and an English Setter, Alley in Westfield, NJ.

Tuesday, January 04, 2005

AICPA Inside AICPA: "Staff Member Wins PFP Award

In the past, Phyllis Bernstein (below, right), AICPA director of personal financial planning, was accustomed to presenting the PFP divisions Distinguished Service Award at the AICPAs annual PFP technical conference. But this year she received itin a very rare occurrence of an Institute committee voting to give an award to an AICPA staff member. Bernstein, who believed no award would be given for 1996, was surprised by the announcement at the PFP conference in San Antonio, Texas. Stuart Kessler (below, left), AICPA vice-chairman, who has long been involved with the PFP division, made the announcement.
President Barry Melancon praised the PFP executive committees decision, saying, 'I think this is a wonderful statement about the quality of work that Phyllis does and the respect she has earned from our members.' "

Monday, January 03, 2005

Grandfather Economic Report - Home Page - by MWHodges:

"Each generation hopes their children will have
more freedom and economic opportunity
Certain trends threaten their future "

Social Security crisis? What crisis? - Dec. 20, 2004: "Social Security: Crisis? What crisis?

Some experts say the urgency to reform Social Security is manufactured -- and very troubling."

Eliminating the Social Security Payroll Cap: A Bad Idea

Two Ways to Eliminate the Payroll Tax Cap . The payroll tax cap could be eliminated in one of two ways:

The payroll tax cap could be eliminated and workers would earn benefits from the new payments;
Or the cap could be eliminated and workers would not accumulate new benefits.

Both options would increase Social Security tax collections. The first option would also increase Social Security's cost in later years as higher-wage workers retire and collect larger benefits. The second option would break the link between contributions and benefits, making Social Security more like a welfare program than a social insurance program.


The New York Times > Opinion > Editorial: The Social Security Fear Factor

The Social Security Fear Factor


f you've lent even one ear to the administration's recent comments on Social Security, you have no doubt heard President Bush and his aides asserting that a $10 trillion shortfall threatens the retirement system - and the economy itself. That $10 trillion hole is the basis of the president's claim last month that "the [Social Security] crisis is now." It's also the basis of the administration's claim that the cost of doing nothing to reform the system would be far greater than the cost of acting now.

Well, the $10 trillion figure is the closest you can get to pulling a number out of the air. Make that the ether. Starting last year, as the groundwork was being set for the emerging debate, the Social Security trustees took the liberty of projecting the system's solvency over infinity, rather than sticking to the traditional 75-year time horizon. That world-without-end assumption generates the scary $10 trillion estimate, and with it, Mr. Bush's putative rationale for dismantling Social Security in favor of a system centered on private savings accounts. The American Academy of Actuaries, the profession's premier trade association, objected to the change. In a letter to the trustees, the actuaries wrote that infinite projections provide "little if any useful information about the program's long-range finances and indeed are likely to mislead any [nonexpert] into believing that the program is in far worse financial condition than is actually indicated."

As it often does with dissenting professional opinion, the administration is ignoring the actuaries. But that doesn't alter the facts or common sense. If the $10 trillion figure is essentially bogus, so is the claim that Social Security is in crisis. The assertion that doing nothing would be costlier than enacting a privatization plan also turns out to be wrong, by the estimates of Congress's own budget agency.

Over a 75-year time frame, Social Security's shortfall is estimated by the Congressional Budget Office at $2 trillion and by the Social Security trustees at $3.7 trillion, a manageable sliver of the economy in each case. If the shortfall is on the low side, Social Security will be in the black until 2052, when it will be able to pay out 80 percent of the promised benefits. If it is on the high side, the system will pay full benefits until 2042, when it will cover 70 percent.

Contrary to Mr. Bush's frequent assertion that Social Security is constantly imperiled by political meddling, it has in fact been preserved and improved by political intervention throughout its 70-year history, most significantly in 1983. The system could - and should - be strengthened again by a modest package of benefit cuts and tax increases phased in over decades.

Instead, the administration wants workers to divert some of the payroll taxes that currently pay for Social Security into private investment accounts, in exchange for a much-reduced government benefit. To replace the taxes it would otherwise have collected - money it needs to pay benefits to current and near retirees - the government would borrow an estimated $2 trillion over the next 10 years or so and even more thereafter.

In effect, the administration's plan would get rid of the financial burden of Social Security by getting rid of Social Security. The plan shifts the financial risk of growing old onto each individual and off of the government - where it is dispersed among a very large population, as with any sensible insurance policy. In a privatized system, you may do fine, but your fellow retirees may not, or vice versa.

In any event, doing well under privatization is relative. Congress's budget agency analyzed the privatized plan that is widely regarded as the template for future legislation and found that total retirement benefits - including payouts from the private account plus the government subsidy - would be less than under the present system. The amount available from the privatized system was less even after midcentury, when the current system is projected to come up short.

It should come as no shock that individual investors might not do as well as hoped. The stock market's historical returns - some 7 percent a year - are predicated on a hypothetical investor who bought an array of stocks in the past, reinvested all dividends, never cashed in and never paid commissions or fees. That's not how investing works in the real world. An especially grave danger is that investors would withdraw their funds before retirement, a pattern that is pronounced in 401(k) plans. It would be politically very difficult to refuse people access to accounts that were sold to them on the premise that they - not the government - would own them.

The Congressional Budget Office analysis also likely understates the costs to individuals of privatizing Social Security. The borrowing that would be needed to establish private accounts could lead to higher interest rates, a weaker dollar and slower economic growth. It is also likely that future tax hikes would be required to cover the interest payments on the additional national debt.

The only hands-down winner would be Wall Street, as fees to manage millions of accounts poured in. (Those fees, not incidentally, would come out of your return.) Current stockholders would also stand to benefit, as increased demand pushed up stock prices, giving existing owners a gain at the expense of newcomers who would be forced to buy high. The affluent, who could afford professional investing advice, would also be advantaged, even though everyone would be taking the same risks.

The zeal over privatization is fueled by the belief of Mr. Bush and his supporters that free-market fixes are appropriate for virtually every problem. That faith is misguided. For a society to be functional and humane, it's not enough that some people have a chance to be rich in old age. Rather, all old people must have the dignity of financial security, and that requires universal coverage.

Social Security is the core tier of old-age support, replacing about a third of preretirement income for a typical retiree and providing inflation-proof income for life - a feature not available in private accounts. Its purpose is not to supplant other retirement investing, but to provide a crucial safety net. Anyone who wants to maintain his or her standard of living into old age must also amass substantial personal savings and investments. To introduce the same risk into the core tier of benefits that already exists for the bulk of one's retirement savings would be as unfair as it is unwise.

If Mr. Bush were not so serious about privatizing Social Security, his urgency would be silly. Compared with other challenges looming for the government, it's a non-problem. The shortfall in the Medicare hospital insurance fund is two to three times the size of the Social Security shortfall, and that fund is projected to be insolvent some two to three decades before Social Security. Taken together, the costs of the Medicare prescription benefit and of making the tax cuts permanent - Mr. Bush's two main domestic initiatives - are 5 to 8.5 times larger. And his hair is on fire over Social Security?

One of the most distressing aspects of the debate over Social Security privatization is that it distracts from more pressing issues and obscures better solutions to the problem of secure retirement. A future editorial will discuss new strategies to increase private savings outside of Social Security that draw on market theory and behavioral economics and are more promising than rehashing the same tired formula of tax-sheltered savings accounts. In the meantime, however, Mr. Bush and his supporters will be pursuing their idée fixe of privatization. It's bad policy. And it's bad politics, too, driven by reflex, ideology and special interests, and sustained by conformism that masquerades as party discipline. Lawmakers who still value their right and obligation to think for themselves - and to act in the best interest of their constituents - must champion solutions that will build on Social Security, not undermine it.

Here are some Facts-- Social security is a safety net. How will that aspect be privatized? It won't be! This topic will be explored and debated and discussed. Don't just let it get "fixed".. without asking the right questions and getting answers to the questions. Privatizing is flawed... It would result in inadequate trust fund reserves and increased costs to taxpayers and the federal government.... Not good. Not the answer we need now.

When Social Security was enacted in 1935, the average life expectancy was approximately 65 years. The plan was supposed to aid those who could no longer work. Today, the life expectancy of Americans is approximately 77 years, meaning that people will be collecting Social Security on average about 12 years. Many of us know people who are in their nineties. I don't believe the Social Security system was put into place with the intention of supporting people for 30 years. One approach – change Social Security so that the age at which people collect benefits increases to be more in line with how our lives have changed since 1935. more on that later....

washingtonpost.com: Palestinian Stirrings

Something is stirring in Gaza. There is a sense of hope and possibility, a belief that it is time for a change. And there is a new discourse that includes all Palestinian factions and an open questioning of violence. I witnessed all this in an extraordinary event hosted in Gaza City by Ziad Abu Amr, a Palestinian legislator and chairman of the Palestinian Council on Foreign Relations.

He invited me to address a conference on the peace process. As I learned on my arrival in Gaza, he also invited leading members of what is euphemistically known as the "Palestinian Opposition" -- Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front -- to the event, and they were part of an audience of 200 people. In the morning they heard Mark Otte and Oleg Kalugin, peace coordinators of the European Union and Russia. In the afternoon, they heard Nabil Shaath, the Palestinian Authority's foreign minister, and me.

I was asked to speak about the role of the United States. Even before I spoke, I heard Otte and Kalugin challenged not on their own positions but on American behavior. The United States was charged with being biased, uncaring and a party to the punishment that Israel has inflicted on Palestinians. But in the midst of what was often a highly emotional litany of complaints and charges, I found this same Palestinian audience openly asking the official representatives of the European Union and Russia about Palestinian responsibilities. What is it, they asked, that Palestinians must do now?

As someone who probably dealt with Yasser Arafat more than any non-Palestinian, I can safely say that Palestinian responsibility was never on his agenda. Arafat made being a victim a strategy, not just a condition, and thus Palestinians were entitled, never responsible. Yet, here in Gaza, no one challenged those Palestinians who raised questions about their responsibilities. And while most of the comments directed to me were about America's responsibility to right the wrongs done to the Palestinians, some in the audience picked up my challenge to recognize that the United States could help the Palestinians only if they were prepared to fulfill their obligations, particularly on security. Indeed, when I declared that there would be no Palestinian state born of violence -- with the leading proponents of that violence sitting there -- several Palestinians responded by saying that violence was a mistake and nothing would be achieved by it.

What struck me about these comments was that there was no hesitancy to make them. With the opposition sitting there, with the entire conference being conducted in Arabic and televised throughout the Middle East, declaring that violence against the Israelis was wrong bore no stigma and apparently little risk. Declaring that Palestinians had responsibilities to fulfill was also treated as legitimate, not sacrilegious.

Afterward, when I expressed surprise that neither the audience comments on violence nor my reference to the Palestinian obligation to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure drew rebuttals, Ziad and Samir Shawa (a leading Palestinian businessman) expressed no surprise. In their words, Palestinians wanted to see the violence end.

Remarkably, all this is happening in no small part because Arafat has passed from the scene. With him, there was paralysis not only between the Palestinians and the Israelis but also among the Palestinians. And Palestinians better than anyone else understand this. How else can one explain the changing Palestinian mood? Before Arafat's death, roughly 40 percent of Palestinians polled were optimistic about the future. Now the number is 59 percent. Before Arafat's death, Hamas's standing was higher than Fatah's -- 32 to 29 percent. The most recent polls show Fatah at 46 percent and Hamas at 17 percent. There should be no surprise here: When there is no hope, Hamas and all radical Islamists will always do better. But when there is hope and a sense of promise, the secularist nationalists in Fatah are seen as the most capable of delivering on that promise. (Hamas's apparent success in the initial municipal elections doesn't contradict this point; the local elections reveal less about large political trends and more about the weight of family, clan and highly localized issues.)

But with promise comes expectation. Life must get better, the Israeli siege must be lifted and a political pathway that offers the clear prospect of fulfilling national aspirations must be restored. Unfortunately, none of this will happen by itself. Israelis, who are now hopeful and open to helping the new Palestinian leadership, will understandably judge Mahmoud Abbas, after he is elected, by what he does, not what he says, to stop terror. And Palestinians remain far more likely to try to co-opt groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad than to confront them. That is why they will opt for a cease-fire, and why the Israelis will be highly suspicious that such a cease-fire would simply give Hamas and others the respite they need to rebuild the capability to carry out terrorism. It will take the active help of the United States to forge a common approach with common understandings on what a cease-fire is and isn't, and how it will relate to obligations both sides have on the "road map" for the peace process.

The stirrings I saw in Gaza demonstrate there is an opening. But the daily firings of rockets against the Israeli city of Sderot and the Gush Katif settlement -- and Israeli responses -- are reminders of how fragile and temporary that opening may be. Palestinians who believe in ending violence and in coexistence failed to deliver in the summer of 2003, when Abbas was prime minister. He and the reformers will shortly have a second chance. If they fail this time, they won't get a third.

The writer was special Middle East coordinator under President Bill Clinton and is now counselor of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of "The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace."