The Response of American Jews to the Holocaust
n the United States, the late 1930’s marked a rebirth of an economy that had just endured nearly a decade of financial collapse. Americans, during these years, were using the expanding economy to rebuild their financial losses of the depression. However, for the small minority of Jews living in the United States, which totaled 3.2 to 3.5 percent of the population, economic growth was a small plus as compared to the events being imposed by Nazi Germany in Europe (Feingold, “Could”). American Jews were hearing for the first time of the measures being imposed upon the European Jews as a result of the intellectual genius of German leader Adolph Hitler. Hitler’s unified Nazi forces were using their strength and unmatched power to conquer Europe by surprise, and one of their first steps was the destruction of Eastern European Jews. The Nazis used widespread massacres and executions, mass arrests, forced labor, and expulsions as a means to satisfy their leader. Early in September of 1939 Nazi forces invaded Poland and waged a two-month campaign that ended with the deaths of fifteen thousand Jews and Poles (Grobman). This event was the beginning of what one knows today as the Holocaust or the destruction of millions of Jews by the Nazis. How did the Holocaust affect the lives of American Jews in the United States? What was the American Jewish response to the devastation of their European brethren?
When the news of Hitler’s dominance in Europe initially reached the United States, Americans gave little thought to the actual relevance of the events and continued with their daily lives. In fact, Peter Novak in “The Holocaust as an American Jewish Experience” states that the American Jewry’s initial experience of the Holocaust was not “traumatic” in any worthwhile sense of the word. Rather, the American Jewry continued to pursue their financial goals and shunned the idea of the Holocaust having any great impact upon their lives. However, the mild response of the American Jews was not one solely based upon their own beliefs and opinions; the influence of the media played an essential role in the American Jewry’s response, also. For instance, an editorial in the New York Times explained that the media had been reluctant to report of the continuing atrocity stories coming out of Poland because the stories were thought to be unofficial accounts of exaggerated horrors (Grobman). Likewise, a majority of the media sources chose to hold back the information coming from Europe on the basis that they believed the news of the annihilation of Europe’s Jews would cause Americans to demand more be done (Vanden Heuvel 46). However, when stories were published concerning the devastation of the Jews in Europe, a number of Jews doubted the authenticity of the horror tales, stating that American newspapers rarely suppressed news (Grobman). Therefore, American Jews were left not only unknowledgeable of the actual significance of Hitler’s actions, but also in disbelief of the facts they did receive.
The facts the American society received of the events caused by Hitler’s Nazi regime were relatively appalling for the time, no event had ever been of such magnitude and disgust, as that of the one Hitler was waging against the Jews. In fact, Winston Churchill referred to the Holocaust as “The greatest and most terrible crime ever committed in the whole history of the world” (qtd. in Vanden Heuvel 35). However, the evident truth in Churchill’s words could best be seen in the initial response of American Jews, which was characterized by disbelief. Most of the American Jews doubted that the Holocaust would ever become central to their life, or that any kind of response would have had a great impact in determining the fate of their European brethren. Henry L. Feingold shares this view in “Could American Jews Have Done More” where he states that the Holocaust was a catastrophe of such a vast scale and such tragic proportions that enough could never have been done.
In addition to the disbelief and newly recognized destruction, American Jews faced the emergence of anti-Semitism. Feingold reports that the popularity of American Jews among society during the thirties was minimal, as a result of their rapid rate of materialization from the depths of the depression, which created hostility and envy among other groups (“Could”). Also, anti-Semitic groups claimed that Jews were a strongly united group that unified to conspire to take over and rule the world, when in truth these groups knew Jews were weak, which stimulated their sadistic impulses (Novak). However, the Jewish community was aware of the presence of these groups, and for many, anti-Semitism became the most constant source of concern (Feingold, Bearing 206). Therefore, Jews were often hesitant to show their true feelings towards the events of the Holocaust, as they feared the circumstances of being recognized by the anti-Semites, who were using their presence to control the response of the American Jewish community. Feingold makes this clear in Bearing Witness – How America and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust when he states that American Jews were “preoccupied with their own security. Even as they mobilized all communal resources to help achieve victory, the fear persisted that the still-powerful anti-Semitic elements would single Jews out as draft dodgers and war profiteers” (222). Also, Boston’s Jewish Advocate states that as anti-Semitic views intensified and country after country came under Hitler’s control, the American Jewry was incapable of showing further expressions of pain (Grobman).
During the midst of the war, the response of American Jewry is often characterized as one of failure. One of the reasons for this is that the overall agenda of American Jewry during these years was unequivocally for integration rather than any kind of separation; for stressing what united Jews with other Americans, not what separated or distinguished them (Novak). The American Jewish community seemed to be more concerned with the individual aspects of becoming respected members of society, rather than uniting to show concern towards the Holocaust. In fact, during the 1930’s “American Jewish Communities” were not present instead there were small communities each of which had their own agenda and ideology (Feingold, Did 11). Consequently, the conflict among the Jewish communities actually increased as the crisis developed which gave the apparent realization that the American Jewry was more anxious to tear itself apart than to give help to its brethren being devastated in Europe (Feingold, Did 6). However, one should ask the question pertaining to whether or not the American Jewry should have put aside their differences during a time of such a tragic crisis against those of their own religious conviction (Feingold, Did 16). The answer would reflect the fact that the distance, which divided the Jews, was far too great for any leader to succeed in Jewish unification, and, therefore, bring about an actual difference in the outcome of the Holocaust (Feingold, Did 13). It is for this reason, that Feingold believes the unhurried response by Jewish organizations to the Holocaust, which gave them time to muck around while Jews burned, was caused by the Jewish disunity and not caused by the prevailing anti-Semitic views (Medoff).
In the same respects to the failure of Jewish organizations to unite, it can be claimed that the response of those Jewish Americans holding government offices can be characterized as a failure, also. During Roosevelt’s term as president, a number of Jews held positions, some of which were among the President’s closest advisors (Vanden Heuvel 43). In fact, because they chaired the House of foreign Affairs, House of Immigration and Naturalization, and House Judiciary, anti-Semites renamed the New Deal the “Jew Deal” (Feingold, Did 10). However, the Jewish presence in government had a minimal influence on the actual position the United States took during the Holocaust. The reason for this, as Feingold states is because it is not only dangerous to express goals, which serve an ethnic interest at the expense of the American interest, but also that “There is always a limit to the amount of influence an ethnic sub group can exercise on policy, a limit which becomes more constricted during time of war” (Feingold, Did 18). As a consequence of these restrictions, the Jewish society made a number of charges against those Jews who had a place and power in the Roosevelt administration for their failure to respond to the actions of the Holocaust (Feingold, “Could”; Feingold, Did 6).
One of the main issues that American Jews holding government offices pressed for was the rescue of European Jews from the control of Nazi concentration camps. The Jewish leaders used every available source and power to make this known. For example, Jewish communities in the United States held mass rallies, lobbied Congress, and prayed for the stopping of the genocide. Also, Jewish leader Rabbi Stephen Wise, who was a close adviser to Roosevelt, organized a New York rally to protest Nazi treatment of Jews. However, Wise received a message from leading German rabbis urging him to stop such events, which they believed indicated that American Jews were organizing the events to promote their own good and in the process were unknowingly destroying the Germany the German Jews loved (Vanden Heuvel 48, 36). Consequently, this explicit showing of anger toward the American Jewry from their European brethren was one of the many reasons for which the Jewish American hopes that those inside Roosevelt’s inner circle would enhance the Jewish influence never proved to be realistic. For that reason, they turned to favor quiet behind the scenes diplomacy, as compared to public displays of emotional protests and rallies. In fact, the idea of a wartime rescue of the Jews from concentration camps was never brought to the attention of Roosevelt or made a priority; rather, the major focus was on winning the war as quickly as possible (Feingold, Did 27, 12, 8). Furthermore, Vanden Heuvel reports that when the proposition to bomb concentration camps to free Jewish prisoners was made, the mainstream Jewish opinion was in opposition to the whole idea on the basis that the intentional killing of Jews by Allied forces would free minimal survivors who had no where to run. Additionally, it is the belief of many that the presence of anti-Semitism alone spared the concentration camps the wrath of the bombing by the Army Air Force (50 – 51). Therefore, the response of the American Jews to rescue those of Europe was not a failure, but a combination of the lack of support and power needed wage such an operation.
Today, more than fifty years after the Holocaust, of the two percent of Jewish Americans who had direct experiences with the event that claimed millions of innocent lives, a great number have passed away or are in the later stages of life. For this reason, the actual response of the American Jewry in the present day is one that Peter Novak refers to as dependent upon a vicarious experience of the Holocaust, or one in which others share in by means of imagined participation. In addition, Novak also states, “…virtually the only basis of their Jewish identity is a vicarious sense of shared persecution and victimhood.” However, whether or not the truth is evident that they are unable to distinguish themselves solely based upon religious beliefs or cultural traits, and must rather unite to be distinguished by their shared persecution and victimhood, is one of question. Furthermore, these statements provide the understanding that the American Jewry remains to feel the effects of the historic persecution of the European Jews, and one may argue that Vanden Heuvel’s statement which states, “American Jewry was no passive observer of these events,” can be used to represent the response of the present Jewish population (48).
The response of the American Jewry is characterized by more than just a vicarious experience of victimhood. Today, many young American Jews criticize their grandparents and parents for being so concerned with becoming assimilated in American society that they chose silence rather than voice outrage at the Nazi crimes (Vanden Heuvel 35). Yet, one question that should be asked in this situation is whether or not they exclusively blame these people for failing to respond more actively. Feingold makes the answer to this question clear in a statement where he reports that Jews believe the American government could have played a larger role in the Holocaust and, consequently, have written history accordingly (Did 2). Therefore, young American Jews have responded with feelings not only towards their elders, but also towards the American government, which was headed by a man whom they similarly placed in the same context as Jesus (Medoff). Although, as the years surpass a half-century since the Holocaust took place, the present impact of the actual events seems to have decreased from the initial state. This can be expected among most members of society, as the occurrence of such an event becomes one of non-existence and disbelief once more. However, the feelings of many Jewish Americans are to a certain extent inverse. For instance, Novak wrote, “In recent times the Holocaust has moved from striking marginality in the first postwar years, when it figured very little in Jewish discourse, to striking centrality and has become omnipresent.” The significance of such a statement seemingly reflects the general response of American Jews after the Holocaust, in that the feelings caused by Hitler’s overpowering mind have become fundamental in their faith.
The possible devastations of a new day are unforeseeable, however, the devastation experienced by the Jewish faith, as a result of the rise of Nazism imposed by German leader Adolph Hitler, was of a new kind and unparalleled in all of history. The Holocaust, which claimed the lives of millions of Jewish men and women, changed the lives of American Jews forever. As a result of the report by the Jewish Frontier, which quoted a Nazi statement that reported the Jewish question had been solved except for the five million Jews of the United States, the American Jewry felt a sense of apprehension beyond that imposed by the emerging anti-Semitic groups (Grobman). During this period, the American Jewry was one of disunity and weakness, although, as Feingold writes, “…lack of concern for Jews abroad has never been one of them.” Yet, not only their initial response, but also their interwar response can be characterized by the following statement: “American Jewry failed to adequately respond to the crisis, failed to adequately use the power available to it and dissipated its considerable organizational and human resources in internal strife” (Feingold, Did 32, 7). Though, the consequences of their failure to unite and utilize the power they held in offices to push for the rescue of European Jews, ultimately, ended with the preservation of a far greater number of lives by winning the war than could ever have been rescued (Vanden Heuvel 48). Additionally, during the postwar years, the Allied forces and United States have been claimed as accomplices to Hitler and the Nazi Forces for not doing enough to counter the destruction. However, each of these groups, including those of the Jewish faith, which accounted for 550,000 allied soldiers, responded with the termination of the Jewish killers (Vanden Heuvel 52; Feingold, Bearing 222).
